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1. INTRODUCTION 
With the end of the Cold War， development cooperation policy， 
like trade policy in the mid 1960 s and international financial policy 
in the early 1980 s， has become a major element of the foreign pol“ 
icy of every industrialized country_ill Opportunities and constraints 
in intemational relations are increasingly originating in developing 
countries. The breakdown of the Soviet Empire has relegated a 
cluster of the former communist countries to the status of merely 
“poor" developing countries， some of which neither share the norms 
concerning democracy and markets espoused by developed coun. 
This article was originally prepared for a panel，“German and 
]apanese Foreign Policies in the Post-Cold War Era， " inthe 
joint convention of the Intemational Studies Associations and 
the ]apan Association of International Relations held at酌laku-
hari， 20-22 September， 1996. 1 am grateful to insightful com-
ments from Simon Reich during the panel discussion. 
(1) Richard N. Cooper， 
Policy 9 (羽f弓inter1972/73幻)， 18-36; Ber吋1リjaminJ. Cohen， In Whose 
Interest?: Int町 nationalBanking and AmericanF旦rei旦 Policy
(N ew Haven: Yale University Press， 1986). 
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Figure 1 
tries nor possess， any longer， absolute deterrence to war.(21 
Japan and Germany are key to prospects for the future stability 
How Japanese and German surplus capi-of North-South relations. 
tal has been and will be used in the emerging world order is a cru-
cial question， especial1y in出econtext of fragmenting regional 
blocs. 
Adam Przeworski， Democracy and the Market: Political and 
Economic Reform in Eastern Europe and Latin America(Cam働
bridge: Cambridge University Press， 1991)， pp.189-191; James 
M. Goldgeier and Michael McFaul，“A tale of two worlds: 
Core and periphery in the post-cold war era，" 1nternational Or-
型豆空当旦46，2(Spring 1992)， 467-491. 
(2) ???
? ?
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In this new context of international relations， the puzzle I want 
to solve here is why Japan's development cooperation policy has 
changed drastically since the mid--1970 s in accordance with the 
structural change in the international economy-from mercantilism 
toward support of international cooperation-while Germany， a sec噂
ondary and civilian power similar to Japan， demonstrated litle en-
thusiasm for international causes. Figure 1 illustrates a digested 
story of Japan's change and Germany's continuity. The increase in 
Japan's share of official development assistance (ODA) among Or-
ganization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
countries， especially after 1975， seems to correspond to the United 
States' relative decline and Japan's meteoric rise in the interna-
tionaI economy， while Germany's incremental change seems to be 
independent of structural change in the international system. In 
1970， Japan was the fifth largest donor country after the United 
States， France， West Germany， and the United Kingdom. In 1989， 
Japan took over the American position as the largest aid donor for 
the first time in the post-war history. Though the United States 
temporarily regained the number one position in 1990， Japanese pre-
dominance in the field of world development has been stable since 
1991_(3J 
This paper argues that J apan's policy change in response to 
structural change in the international economy is predicated upon 
its systematically vulnerable international position. Put differently， 
Japan's internationalism embodied by the expansion of development 
cooperation is informed by its international position， which relies 
on existing liberal international economic arrangements much more 
???
?
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heavily than does regionally embedded Germany's. The collapse of 
the international system inflicts tremendous costs on the ]apanese 
economy. 
2. INTERNATIONAL POSITIONS 
The internatIonal position of a state informs its systemic vul-
ner些盟主土 International position is determined by the degree of 
embeddedness of a state in the international or regional system. 
The international position is not determined by the distribution of 
capabilities. 1 want to treat the state's position within the interna-
tional division of labor， or economic interdependence.i41 Economic 
interdependence， which is taken for granted in the conventional 
analysis of industrialized countries' foreign economic policies， must 
??
(3) ln terms of degree of change in the share of ODA， we can ar-
range the four secondary powers in the order of ]apan， France， 
Britain， and Germany. France has gradually increased its share 
of total world ODA from 9.6% in 1975/76 to 12.2% in 1990/91， 
while Britain's share declined from 5.5% to 4.7% in the same 
period. Akira Nishigaki and Yasutami Shimomur.a， Kaihatsu 
J<:njqno Keizaigaku-K盟主L旦 Sek豆1121ihEJm旦DA[Eco-
nomics of Development Assistance: The World of Economic 
Symbiosis ana ]apan's ODA} (Tokyo : Yuhikaku， 1993)， p.8. 
Needless to say， the exchange rate effect of the ]apanese yen 
and the Deutschmark after the Plaza Accord in 1985 cannot ex-
plain either the timing of the ]apanese increase or German con均
tinuity. Between 1985 and the end of 1980 s， the yen appreciated 
about 40% (trade-weighted exchange rate)， and 80% by 1994 af-
ter the temporary depreciation in 1990. The mark， on the other 
hand， has been incrementally appreciating and the exchange 
rate of 1994 was 20% higher. than the 1985 rate. The Economist， 
iえpril6 th， 1994， p.131. 
4 
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be a subject of analysis if we are to understand the causes of the 
differing policy dynamics of Japan and Germany. Understanding Ja. 
pan's postwar vulnerability requires us to clearly distinguish sys・
The !atter was de-temic vulnerability from actor vulnerability. 
fined by Albert Hirschman as an asymmetrical structure of costs of 
change in bilateral economic relations.(S) Systemic vulnerability is a 
function of the “scope" of the economies in which a country's eco-
Scope is much more important than cur-nomic welfare is realized. 
rent discussions of the international postions of states， which em・
The phasize the size or magnitude of interdependence， recognize.(6) 
level of interdependence is usually measured in the latter terms， 
that is， by gauging export dependence and multinationality of for-
eign investment or volume of international capital moblity. Empiri-
cal analyses based upon size measurements tend to conclude that in-
creased interdependence promotes liberalization of trade policy and 
coordination of monetary and fiscal policies among industrialized 
However， such measurements of interdependence mis-countries.17J 
???
? ?
specify the real economic vulnerablity that led Japan to liberaliza-
A similar discussion can be found in Stephan Haggard，“Struc同
turalism and Its Critics: Recent Progress in International Rela-
tions Theory，" in Emanuel Adler and Beverly Crawford， eds.， 
Progress in Postwar International Relations (New York: Co喝
lumbia University Pr白色 1991)，pp.410-22. 
Albert O. Hirschman， National Power and the Structure of For-
豆豆主主盟坐(Berkeley:University of California Press， 1945). 
A similar discussion can be found in J ohn M‘ Stopford and 
Susan Strange with John S. Henley， Rival States， Rival Firms: 
Competition for W orld Market Shares (Cambridge: Cam-
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tion. 1n fact， such interdependence theory predicts increasing pro-
tectionism， compared to other industrialized countries， for Japan. 
The J apanese economy's dependence on international trade has 
been stable since the 1960 s， with imports plus exports holding at 25 
percent of its G NP， while Germany's trade dependence doubled 
from 25 percent to 50 percent over the last four decades. Despite its 
lower reliance on the international economy， Japan's customs duty 
ratios (total duty income/total volume of imports)， for example， has 
been the lowest among the OECD countries since the early 1980 S.181 
We must focus on the scope of interdependence to understand how 
interdependence approaches “complex interdependence" and to ex-
plore cross-nationally the different impacts of interdependence on 
state policy choice.191 
The scope of interdependence should be measured on both hori‘ 
(7) Helen V. Milner， Resisting Protectionism: Global lndustries 
and the Politics of International Trade (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press， 1988); Michae. C. Webb， The Political Econ-
omy of PoIicy Coordination: International Adjustment since 
並立(Ithaca:Cornell University Pr問 1995).
(8) Ryutaro Komiya，主h旦2担伊豆旦主包型旦y: T往生， Ind盟主L
and Government (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press， 1990)， 
p.77; Keizai Koho Center， Japan 1992: An International Com-
胆n担旦(Tokyo:Keizai Koho Center， 1991)， p.30. 
(9) The characteristics of complex interdependence include multi-
ple channels of transnational reJations such as interstate， trans司
五 governmentalrelations; the absence of hierarchy among issues 
八 thatmakes no difference betwe吃nhigh politics and low poli-
tics; and the minor role of military force. Robert O. Keohane 
~ and J oseph S. N ye， Power and 1nterdep旦生虫色 SecondEdition 
(Glenview Ilinois: Scott， Foresman and Company， 1989)， pp.23-
25， 254-57. 
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zontal and vertical dimensions: the geographical extent of interde-
pendence and the level of inter-industry trade with and investment 
This is because systemic vulnerability In-in developing countries. 
creases as interdependence wi出 regionsor countries that impose 
Differ司rules and customs that are unfamiliar to出esta te increases. 
ent languages， currencies， commercial laws， as well as cultures and 
histories， tend to increase transaction costs associated with transna・
tionaI economic exchang回， and thus the globally interdependent 
state has to rely on intemational institutions and/or a dominant 
The dis-power in order to maintain international economic order. 
ruption of multilateral arrangements or the rapid decline of the he帽
gemonic power will cause far greater damage to a global1y interde-
pendent state than to a regional state which is embedded in region-
ally institutionalized economic transactions. 
Systemic vulnerability becomes more conspicuous if a state 
either chooses or must be involved in North-South interdependence. 
This is because multilateral arrang釘nentsare ncecessary if the in-
terdependent state is to manage白e“structuralconflict" between 
As Albert Hirschman and industrialized and developing countries. 
Stephen Krasner argued， any effort to understand industrIalized 
countries' economic polici白 towarddeveloping countries must start 
by taking cognizance of the international divide between North and 
??
??
South.OID Theyargue出atthere exists a structural conflict， which is 
Albert O.Hirschman， Essays in Trespassing:From Economics to 
Politics and BeyonCI (Cambridge:Cambrid酔 Universitypr宙s，1981);
Stephen D. Krasner， Structural Conflict:The Third W orld Against 
Global Liberalism (Berkeley : University California Press， 1985). 
(10) 
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based upon ideological differences between the North's beHef in 
market-oriented resource allocation and the South's demands that 
states or international organizations control the directions and vol-
umes of resource flows. 
This paper contends that， since the end of the World War I， 
]apan has been a pure trading state， whose international position 
has been determined by global-scope interdependence， while Ger. 
]apan， to a many has been a regionally embedded trading state.ω 
far larger extent than Germany， has consistently suffered from sys・
temic vulnerabiIity to a possible collapse of current international 
regimes. Therefore， inorder to maintain the international economic 
order， itwas in ]apan's interests to extend international coopera-
tion， commensurate with its economic power. Increased economic 
power and a resulting improvement of asymmetrical structures of 
interdependence (actor vulnerablity) cannot reduce ]apan's systemic 
vulnerability， unless it takes 01 hegemonic status in the world econ幽
omyor・establishesa substitute regional autarky. Thus systemic vul. 
nerablity derived from global-scope interdependence creates a nec-
essary condition for・internationalcooperation. 
3. DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION POLlCIES IN JAPAN AND 
GERMANY AFTER THE WAR 
For the common characters of ] apan and Germany as trading 
states that gave up the idea of traditional politco-territorial 
claims， see Richard Rosecrance， The Rise 0f the Trading 
States: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World (New 
Y ork: Basic Books， 1986). 
????? ?
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However Al1 policy patterns consist of change and continuity. 
change has been more prominent In Japanese development coopera-
1n the tion (DC) policy， while in Germany continuity has dominated. 
following， 1 will contrast the differing policy dynamics at work in 
the two countries. Specifically， 1 will describe how， from the mid 
1970 s to the mid-1980 s， Japan changed its economic DC policy 
drastically in order to burden-share with the United States. In COI1-
trast， Germany's policy has consistently attempted to realize the 
economic interests of particular groups within German. 
A. Japan's Development Cooperation Policy after the War: From 
Commercialism to lnternational Cooperation 
The mid-to late-1970 s， especially， the year 1977-78， was a turn-
ing point in Japan's DC policy. Aid was redirected from mercantilist 
efforts to promote J apanese exports and secure raw materials to-
ward projects intended to support international cooperation and 
maintain the United States-led international system. 
When Japan replaced the United States as the largest aid donor 
in Asia in 1977/ωJapanese policy-makers became aware that they 
must support the U.S. -led international economic and security sys-
tem. ln the same year， Japanese foreign direct investment (FDI) in 
Asia surpassed that of the United States at roughly $6 billion.u1J 
???〈
?
Juichi lnada，“Japan's Aid Diplomacy: lncreasing Role for 
Globa1 Security，" Japan Review of lnternationa1 Affairs 2，1 
(SprIng/Summer 1988): 92. The Asian region includes East， 
Southeast， and South Asia. 
(12) 
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When former prime minister Takeo Fukuda visited southeast Asian 
countries in 1977， he proposed a new relationship between ]apan 
and the southeast Asian countries based upon the multilateral 
framework of the Association of South-East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) as a way to stabi!ize the region and take into account the 
shift of power from the United States to ]apan. After Fukuda's 
visit， the word ASEAN replaced southeast Asia in ]apanese politi-
cal parlance.li~ The new international role for ]apan's foreign aid 
was confirmed when representatives of the Japanese and the United 
States governments met in 1978 in Shimoda， Southwest of Tokyo， 
to hold the first-ever meeting to focus exclusively on aid.1l日
Japanese DC po!icy， as has often been pointed out， started as an 
instrument to promote exports of Japanese manufactured goods and 
services and secure imports of natural resources from developing 
countries. Both the Exim Bank， founded in 1950， and the payment of 
war reparations from 1954 were aimed at aiding exports of ]apa-
???
(13) Richard F. Doner，“]apanese Foreign Investment and the Crea-
tion of a Pacific Asian Region，" in Jeffrey A. Frankel and 
Miles Kahler， eds.， !<-e使凶盟主吐旦並立y_:_l_e!盟主Eι生E
United States in Pacific Asia (Chicago and London: The Uni-
versity of Chicago Press， 1993)， p.16L 
(14) Takashi Shiraishi，“Japan and Southeast Asia，" paper prepared 
for the W orkshop，“Japan in Asia，" Cornell University， Center 
for.lnternationaJ Studies and Southeast Asian Program， March 
31-ApriJ 1， 1995， p.29 
(15) Since then high-ranking officials of the US Agency for Interna-
tional Development and the MOFA's Economic Cooperation 
Bureau have agreed to meet more or less annually. 
10 
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nese machinery and manufacturing plants， mostly to Southeast 
Asia， and imports of raw materials such as oil， iron ore， tin and 
rubber from the same region.IW) MITI's first white paper on eco-
nomic cooperation clearly articulated that 
The fundamental principles of our economic coopera-
tion policy include not only advancing developing 
countries' economic development but also contributing 
to the expansion of markets for J apanese exports and 
securing imports of crucial raw materials， both of 
which solidify the future direction of our economy.附
When the budget alIocation for economic cooperation expenditures 
became an important item (かuyokeihi) in the Japanese general 
budget in 1958， itwas placed under the heading of export promo-
tion. That is， Japanese poIicy-makers saw no distinction between 
economic cooperation and export promotion in the very early stage 
of Japan's DC policy.u国Althoughtied aid， which links foreign aid 
(16) For studies of Japanese economic cooperation policies before 
the 1970 s， see Sukehiro Hasegawa， Japanese Foreign Aid: Pol-
icy and Practice (New York: Praeger PubIishers， 1975); and 
Alexander CaldwelI，“The Evolution of Japanese Economic Co倫
operation: 1950-1970，" in Harold B. Malkgren， ed.， Pacific Ba噂
豆旦主竺d盟主型!(Lexington， MA: D.C. Health and Co.， 1972)， 
pp.23-60. 
0乃TsushoSangyosho (MITI)， Keizai Kyoryoku， 1958， p.1 (preface). 
The MOF A often used the term “long-term national interests，" 
instead of export promotions or resource imports: Mercantilist 
objectives no doubt dominated policy-making of Japan's DC 
policy until the late 1970 s. Gaimusho (MOFA)， ，iVaga Gaiko no 
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with donor exports， has been criticized by development experts for 
making procurement costs for recipients countries higher than the 
market price by 10 to 30 percent， ]apan did not feel that it was in 
its interests to consider “other" developing countries' fiscal situ-
ations， when ]apan itself was a developing country and chronically 
suffered from a shortage of hard currency.ω 
In the late 1970 s， the policy emphasis shifted toward contribu-
tions to the international community. The use of tied aid for the 
promotion of exports was reconsidered by ]apanese policy-makers 
in the late 1970 s. Whi1e the first untied loan was extended in 1972， 
it was on1y after the late 1970 s that untied ODA expanded remark-
ably and became a national policy. In 1977， the government an-
nounced that， inprincip1e， the ]apanese government would promote 
出eprovision of“untied loans" to developing countries after 1978.側
Because of its significance for ]apan's trade in general， this policy 
shift was confirmed in a joint communique of the United States and 
?????
(18) David Arase， Buying Power: The Political Economy of ]apan's 
Foreign Aicl (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers， 1995). As we 
will see in the next section， 1958 was a turning point for ]a-
pan's DC policy， when war criminal Prime Minister Kishi took 
initiatives to return ]apan's economy to Southeast Asia through 
the use of economic cooperation. 
側 For田 onomicexp1anations of the collective evils derived from 
tied aid， see Catrinus ]. ]epma， The Tyinp: of Aid (Paris: De-
velopment Center of the OECD， 1991)， pp.15-16. 
(20) There are two types of untied aid. The first one is called gen-
eral untied aid， procurement with which is open to suppliers in 
al countries. The second one is partially untied aid， which Iim-
its suppliers of aid-related .goods and services to donor cοun-
tries and developing countries' firms. 
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Japan signed in the same year.叫 Sincethen， as Table 1 shows， the 
tied aid portion， which inclucles so callecl “partially untied" aicl that 
limits procurement by aicl recipients to aid donors and developing 
countries， has steaclily decreased， ancl by the micldle of the 1980 s， 
Japan became one of the most liberal aid clonors among OECD 
countries as reflected in the share of untied aid in total ODA. The 
J apanese government even clecided to promote untied “grant" aid， 
in addition to untied “loans，" although grant aid tied to the donor 
country's exports is the international norm.捌 1nthis context， in 
1987， the government chose the Crown Agents， the implementing 
agency of the British Overseas Development Administration， and 
帥 Hasegawa，Ja坦neseForeign Aid， p.4; Tsusho Sangyosho 
(MITI)， K豆担iK白立生旦， 1977， p.101; Ken-ichi Imai， Yumiko 
Okamoto， Kazuhiko Y okota， and Akira Hirata，“Nihon no 
Seifu-Kaihatsu-Enjo no Tenkai [The Evolution of Japan's 
Overseas Development AssistanceJ，" in 1ppei Yamazawa and 
Mitsuru Hirata， e出，堕h主主主笠生ιYoro盟竺旦oK豆国民
主担ry旦担Sei坦担 [DevelopmentCooperation Policy in Japan， 
America， and EuropeJ (Tokyo: Ajia Keizai Kenkyjo， 1992)， 
p.34. 
0場 Generallyspeaking， donor countries that emphasize grant aid， 
ra出erthan loan aid， such as出eScandinavian countries ancl 
Britain， tend to have high tying status， because grants are usu‘ 
ally provided to developing countries on a condition that goods 
and services be purchased from donor countries. For more dis-
cussion about the correlation between grant portion and tied 
aid， see Akira Nishigaki and Yasutami Shimomura， K豆hats竺
Enjo no Keizaigaku: Kyosei no Sekai to Nihon no ODA [Eco・
nomics of Development Assistance: The W orld of Economic 
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United Nations Development Program as executive agencies to im-
plement Japan's $500 million non-project grant aid to Sub-Saharan 
Africa.ω 
The decrease in officially tied aid has resulted in a shrinking 
share for Japanese companies of the goods and services purchased 
with Japanese aid money. The traditional practice of Japanese for-
eign aid implementation， inwhich Japanese trading firms consult 
with the governments of recipient countries， while communicating 
closely with bureaucrats in Japanese embassies and in Tokyo， write 
drafts of feasible economic projects， and advise the local govern-
ments to request official yen loans from the J apanese government， 
has rapidly become anachronistic. As the untied portion of Japa-
nese ODA has increased， Japanese businesses have lost incentiv田 to
find feasible development projects. As was often pointed out by 
foreign observers， itwould be possible for Japanese companies to 
win international contracts for the untied aid provided by Japan， if
the project designs， usually prepared by development consultants 
before bidding， include goods and services in which J apan has a 
competitive advantage against other countries. However， since the 
late 1980s， the government， inresponse to foreign criticism， liberal-
ized loans for feasibility studies， design and preparation of bidding 
。場 JuliaChang Bloch，“A U.S.-Japan Aid Alliance?" in Shafiqul Is-
lam， ed.， Yen for Development: Japanese Foreign Aid and the 
Politics of Burden-Sharin直 (NewYork: Council on Foreign 
Relations Press， 1991)， p.73; Toru Yanagihara and Anne Emig， 
“An Overview of Japan's Foreign Aid，" in Islam， ed.， X旦 for
Development， p.52; Jepma， The Tying of Aid， p.91. 
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documents， and construction supervision and project management， 
so that Japanese consultants， in cooperation with trading firms， 
cannot rig project designs to favor ]apanese products.11J Since 1987， 
the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund's (OECF) consulting 
awards， both loans and grants， provided to such countries as South 
Korea， Malaysia， Thailand， the Philippines， Brazil， and Papua New 
Guinea for engineering consulting have become generally untied. 
This contributed to the drastic drop in ]apan's procurement share 
in 1990. (see Table 1). OECF's initiatives to promote project identi. 
fication and implementation without the involvement of Japanese 
business inc1ude “SpeciaI Assistance for Project Formation 
(SAPROF)" from 1990 and “Special Assistance for Project Imple. 
mentation (SAPI)" frol11 1992.1~) For Japanese cOl11panies， making 
profits directly frol11 ODA business is a bit of the good old days; 
for the government， the trend toward untied aid is irreversible， even 
as opposition， l11ainly frol11 big trading firms， has increased， espe司
ciaIly as the Japanese economy has struggled to exit frol11 one of 
the worst economic recessions since the war.楓
Since the middle of the 1980 s， the J apanese government has en. 
couraged American companies to acquire a bigger share of procure. 
(24) Consulting accounts for 2 to 5% of Japanese yen loan ODA. En. 
gineering Consulting Firms Association， Japan， Heisei 4-nendo 
Kaigai Konsarutanto Orienteshon sel11ina [International Con‘ 
sultants Orientation Seminar， 1992](Tokyo: ECFA， 1992)， 
pp.100-10L 
同 Overseas Economic Coop町ationFund (OECF)， 12型竺並旦盟ort，
1993 (Japanese) (Tokyo: OECF， 1993)， pp.21--23; Interview 
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Table 1 
Tying status and procurement of Japanese and German ODA (%) 
1970 75 80 85 90 94 
JAPAN 
Tied ODA/Total ODA" 70.7* 44.2 30.l 18.6 12.5 13.9 
Tied十Partiallyuntied ODA/Total ODA山 71.7ホ 51.8 47.7 34.4 15.3 14.9 
Japan's procurement/Total ODA n.a. n.a.材料70 68 27 27 
GERMANY 
Tied ODA/Tota! ODA 42.7* 30.3 13.l 25.9 38.2 : 37.4 
Tied+Partialy untied ODA/Total ODA 47.4 * 33目9 13.l 25.9 38.2 
Germany's procurement/Total ODA 80 73 63 75 90 
OECD Tota! 
Tied ODA/Tota! ODA 55.l 49.8 36.2 23.5 22.l 
Tied十PartiallyUntied ODA/TotaI ODA 64.6 59.7 42.8 28.2 24.5 
Sources: [Tied/ODA] OECD， Development Cooperation (Paris: OECD)，1974， pp.248 49; 
1976， pp.234-35; 1981， p.199; 1986， p.241; 1992， p.A..15; 1996， p.A-50. [Japan‘s 
Procure江町lent]Shafiqul Islam， "Foreign Aid ancl Bllrclensharing: Is Japan Free 
Riding 10 a Coprosperity Sphere in Pacific A剖a?"in Jeffrey A. Frankel ancl 
Miles Kahler， ecls.， B，銭1EEE1122L担旦Rivalry:Japan and the United States in 
I泊cificAsia (じhicago:The University of Chicago Press， 1993). p.346 
[Germany's Procurementl Catrinus J. Jepma， The Tying of Aicl (Paris: Devel-
opment Center of !he OECD， 1991)， p.25; for 1970 figure; Ranald S. May， 
Dieter Schumacher ancl Mohammed H. Malek， 0verseas Aid: The Impact on 
I~ritain and Gennany (Ne叩 York:Harvester Wheatsheaf， 1989)， p.37 for 75， 
80，85 figures; Hans H. L印nbke，“NikokllkanEnjo no Keitai to Hoshiki，" in Ip-
pei Yamazawa Akira Hirata， eds.， Developm巴ntCooperation Policies of Jap司n，
the United States， ancl Ellrope (Tokyo: The Institute ()f Developing Econo 
miesら1992)，p.29:3 for 90 figure 
Notes: *1972 fignre 
村 incluclingboth bilateral ancl multilateral ODA (印mmitmentba剖s)
***Partially llntk>d loans incllcle developing cOllntries as well as the aid donor 
COllntry as goot]s ancl services sllppliers related ωthe loans. 
*木材]983figure 
。6) Interview No. 26， Tokyo， April 1， 1994. For voices that main-
tain J apan's economic interests in imp!ementing aid policy， see 
Yomiuri Shimbur1， January 25， 1994， p.3. 
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ment using Japanese ODA. The Councilor of the Economic Coop‘ 
eration Bureau of the MOFA made an official trip to the United 
States in 1989 to give a lecture on procurement procedures for Japa-
nese ODA at seminars sponsored by the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) in San Francisco and Orlando 
Also， in1992， the Tokyo ODA Conference was hosted by the US 
government under the banner of global partnership. And the U.S. 
Department of Commerce published Japan's Foreign Aid Program: 
Opportunities for U.S. Business， a book designed to help U.S. busi回
nesses participate in J apan's ODA. These efforts increased the 
share of U.S. companies in Japanese ODA procurement from 2 per-
cent in 1986 to around 5 percent in 1994.ITJ 
B. Germany's Development Cooperation Policy after the War: Do-
mestic Interests 
Germany's DC policy has been much more stable and consistent 
than has Japan's. Official Government policy concerning develop-
ment cooperation， as expressed in the 
Policy" of 1971; 1972， and 1973， the“Twenty-five Theses" of 1975， 
the “Seventeen Theses" of 1979， and the “Fundamental Aspects of 
Development Policy" of 1980， have al involved a compromise be-
帥 ECokusai Kaihat里_y_l豆旦笠旦， July 1989， pp.26-27. Michael Wil‘ 
liams，“U.S. Seeks to Help Companies Obtain More of Japan's 
Foreign-Aid Budget，"日立宜主1Str盟主Jo竺rn主1，June 10， 1994， 
p.A 6; Margee M. Ensign， Doing Good or Doi盟主出じ主担出
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tween humanitarianism and the commercial interests of Germany. 
For example， one of the Twenty-Five Theses reads:“Development 
Policy is part of the total policy of the Federal Government; the 
latter wiU endeavor during implementation to establish an equaliza-
tion between the exigencies of development policy and our other in-
terests." 臨時 Due to this balancing of policy objectives， German DC 
policy is often found to be between those of hardline countries， 
which give priority to their strategic or economic interests， such as 
the United States， the United Kingdom， and France， and progressive 
states such as the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countri白，
which advocate noblesse oblige in foreign aid.ω 
Economically， German DC policy has been based upon commer・
cially-motivated domestic interests出atattempt to achieve short 
term economic gains through the export of German pr.oducts to de-
veloping countries. Among industrialized countries， Germany has 
been a champion of commercially motivated industrial policy. As in 
?????
(28) Cited in Phoebe Kornfeld-Ulmet，“West German Foreign Aid: 
The Case of Cameroon，" Ph.D. dissertation， Duke University， 
1984， p.81. 
(29) Rolf Hofmeier，“Bonner Entwickungspolitik: Grundlinien und 
Rahmen-bedingungen [German Development Policy: Basic 
Concepts and Actual performance]，" in Reiner Steinweg， ed.， 
Hilfe十Handel= Frieden?: Die Bundesrepublik in der Dritten 
Welt (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp，1982)， pp.241-269; Rolf 
Hofmeier and Siegfried Schultz，“German Aid: Policy and Per-
formance，" in Olav Stokke， ed.， European Development Assis. 
tance: Volume 1， Policies and Performance (Tilburg， the Neth-
erlands: The European Association of Development Research 
and Training Institutes， 1984)， pp.206-238. 
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Japan， DC policy has been a major component of Germany's funda-
mental objective of enhancing its industrial and commercial inter-
ests abroad.側 Policyobjectives such as securing natural resources 
needed to run industries， promoting exports of German manufac-
tured goods to sustain the welfare state， absorbing economic shocks 
derived from cyclical downturns of the domestic economy， and 
maintaining employment in the face of the structural decline of 
heavy industries， have predominated in German development coop-
eration policy. 
To realize these economic interests， successive German govern-
ments have asserted出eimportance of a connection between gov-
ernment official aid and private investment and trade. In fact， the 
German government has occasionalIy explained its economic inter-
ests in terms more unequivocal than those uttered by Japanese pol-
icy-makers. Ludwig Erhard， the “Godfather" of the German eco・
nomic miracle of the 1950 s， contended that:“In any proce田 ofde-
velopment， the socioeconomic overhead capital financed by public 
means must be combined with private initiative."ou Erhard's view of 
cooperation between the government and private sector laid the 
foundation for the continuity of German development policy. The 
。ゆ Andrew]. Spindler， The Politics of International Credit: Pri-
vate Finance and Foreign Policy in Germany and Japan (Wash-
ington D.C.: The Brookings Institute， 1984)， p.14; Andrew A. 
Jones，“A Question of SeIf-Interest?; The PoIicy and Praxis of 
Today's West German Development Aid" (Senior Honors The-
sis， Duke University， 1990). 
(31) Cited in Jack L. Knusel， ~Test German Aid to Developing Na-
tions (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers， 1968)， p.26. 
???
? ?
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Ministry of ECul10mic Cooperation (BMZ) expressed its views 01 
development cooperation in the early 1960 s by maintaining that 
“The cooperation of private forces creates realities by which gov-
ernment po!icy， too， will find its direction.'棚 1n1963， the Bundestag 
passed the Development Assistance Tax Law (Entwicklungshil‘ 
festeuergesetz) that grants German firms a tax waiver when they 
put their profits into reserves against future losses derived from in-
vestment in or lending to developing countries_ω1n 1970 s， the Eco-
nomic Cooperation Minister Eppler Erhard stated that private in-
vestments constituted“the A and 0 of al development policies. 
Everything else was subsidiary.門Il#This commercial motivation re-
mained unchanged， and in 1986 the Federal Government stated in an 
official publication that“It is our legitimate interest to make sure 
that our development assistance， which is taxpayers' money， does 
。今 Citedin Karel Holbik and Henry Allen Myers， West German 
Forei盟主i生ユ956ニl型立:Its Eco旦omicand Political Aspects 
(Boston: Boston University Press)， p.59. 
?????
。事 Thelaw allowed German companies to make tax-free financial 
r田 ervesof up to 50.% of remaining profit in order ωoffset 
losses and to depreciate problem investments at 85% of market 
value and write off 15% of the otherwise taxable profits accru-
ing from the investments. The law was amended later to pro句
vide further incentives to potential investors in developing 
countries‘However， the tax preference was abruptly abolished 
in 1981. See Holbik and Myers， West German Foreign Aid， 
pp.53-59; OECD， 1nvesting in Developing Countries， p_75; 
James Alexander Shaw，“明TestGerman Development Aid，" MA 
Thesis， The Ul1iversity of South Africa， Pretoria， 1971， p.83; 
Knusel， West German Aid， p.78 
同 Citedin Shaw，“West German Development Aid，" p.71. 
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not favor rival industries in other countries."削
The German government particularly el11phasized natural re 
sources development in developing countries. Since Germany had 
lost al of its overseas colonies by the end of World War 1， acquir-
ing sources of raw l11aterials required special efforts frol11 the gov-
ernment. Thus， Latin Al11erican countries became a major destina-
tion of official aid and private investl11ent during the 1960s and 70S.(361 
The Econol11ic Cooperation Ministry under Marie Schlei (1976-78) 
stressed the importance of natural resources : 
A secure supply is of great importance for the FRG as 
the third largest raw material consumer in the West. 
The guarantee of the supply of raw materials is for us 
the primary task of the private sector. The private ac-
tivities can be useful1y complemented by the develop-
ment policy measures of the government.印j
For example， in 1979， Germany's direct investment to Brazil ac-
counted for approximately 50 percent of total direct investment in 
developing countries倒 Aidand investment in Africa， though far 
smal1er than in Latin America， were also directed toward resource 
development.側
This commercially motivated DC policy was shared by the two 
同 Pressand Information Office， Deve凶E塑目立l主主， p.7. 
わゆ Brigitte H. Schulz， “Development Aid and Trade: The Two 
German States and Sub-Saharan Africa， 1960-1985" (Ph.D. dis司
sertation， Boston University， 1989)， pp.l18-119， 141; Wolfgang 
C. Goede， Lateinamerika im Griff der deutscher1 Wirtschaft: 
Eine entwicklungspolitische Bilanz der 70 er Jahre (Munchen: 
Verlag Holler， 1984)， especially pp.90-193. 
。カ Quotedin J ones，“A Question of Self-interest?" pp.14-15. 
五
?、 ? 、? ， ， ， ，
?，?
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“trading states，" ]apan and Germany， at least until the late 1970 s. 
In the 1970 s both countries together accounted for 62 percent of 
OECD bilateral industrial aid.棚 ]apanand Germany similarly mobi. 
lized the finances of semi-governmental organizations for resource 
development. Although funding through Germany's KfW's (Kredi. 
tanstalt fur Wiederaujbau) was less intensive than that offered by ]今
pan's Exim bank during the 1970 s， the KfW's use of its funds for 
developing natural resources was consistent. But， while the ]apa. 
nese Exim Bank shifted its major operations to provision of untied 
loans for non--resource related sectors， the majority of similar loans 
extended by the KfW is stil targeted to raw material sources for 
the German economy.14U 
Export promotion has also been prominent in German DC pol. 
icy since the 1950 s. German foreign aid made its first appearance in 
(:18) German Development Institute (GDI)，“Key Countries in the 
Third World: Implications for Relations betw田 nthe Federal 
Republic of Germany，" Occasiona1 Report of the GDI， 65 (1981)， 
36 -40， and 190-195. 
同 Brigitte Schulz and William Hansen，企旦orIm区豆豆主旦:West 
Germany in Sub-Saharan Africa， Working Papers No. 61 (Afri. 
can Studies Center， Boston University， 1982). 
(40) Robert E. W ood， From Marshall Plan to Debt Crisis: E旦eign
Aid and Development Choices in the World Economy (Califor. 
nia: University of California Press， 1986)， p‘144. 
?????例 Forthe activities of the Exim Bank and KfW in the 1970 s， s配
Philip A. Wellons， Passingthe Buck: Banks， Governments and 
主hir豆亙笠旦旦金!(Cambridge， MA: Harvard Business School， 
1987)， p.67.羽Tithregard to current operations of the KfW， see 
KfW，Facts and Activities， May 1991 (pamphlet)， especially， p.5. 
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the German federal budget in 1956 when DM 50 million was appro-
priated under the commercial section of the Foreign Office. Al-
though the Economics Ministry had already earmarked DM 500.000 
of European Recovery Program (ERP)-resources to send German 
experts to developing countries in 1953， itwas the first official at-
tempt to disburse official money as foreign aid. Germany's capital 
aid programs for the purpose of export promotion started to ex-
pand rapidly after 1958， when the German government committed 
itself to joint credits of DM 660 million for the construction of a 
steel mill in Rourkela， India by the Indian government and two Ger-
man firms， Krupp and Deman. By 1964， the federal government had 
injected D恥1:1.8 bil1ion into the joint venture. Since then， substan-
tial capital aid has been disbursed by the federal government in or圃
der to expand German exports to developing countries under the 
slogan of“aid policy of one piece (Entwicklungspolitik aus einem 
Gus)."(4l) During the 1970 s， South Africa was a major destination of 
capital aid. That country was au important business partner for 
German firms， both.as a supplier of strategic materials such as ura-
nium， chrome and manganese， and as one of the largest buyers of 
nuc1ear power plants. German ODA used for nuc1ear plants was 
generally tied.締
Remarkably， in contrast to the ]apanese， the Germans have 
normal1y managed export promotion without exploiting tied aid. As 
we saw in Table 1， German exports using economic assistance have 
???
例 KlausLinke，“Concepts of National Development Aid，"担笠主
conomics， October 1968， p.307. 
? ?
[nt日rnationalPositions and Development Cooperation Policy in Japan and Germany (Kato) 
been relatively stable at a high level since the 1970 s， while the 
]apanese government intentionally reduced the tying of aid to ex-
ports after the late 1970 s. While Germany has kept officially tied 
aid at around 30 to 40 percent throughout the post-war period (in 
contrast to ]apan's over 70 percent before the late 1970 s) the Ger-
man private sector has succeeded in winning international open bids 
for procurement financed by German aid. For example， during 1978 
-83 German industries' reliance on tied aid， except for railroad 
equipment and ship-building， was one of the lowest among major 
European aid donors.刷) Nevertheless， almost 80 percent of German 
official aid loans and 90 percent of its technical aid has been “unof-
ficially" linked to German business and has flowed back to Ger-
many.附Iforders financed by multinational agencies， untied aid 
from other donors， and indirectly induced demands for German 
products by third-party countries， are taken into account， total pro-
curement exceeded the direct costs of German aid programs by 
some 14 percent during the period 1978-84. 1n the mid 1970 s， 270 
percent of German contributions to the W orld Bank returned to the 
German economy.116J Ironically， when the government attempted to 
respond to current surplus problems and a resultant currency re-
??
同Likethe United Kingdom， Germany was reluctant to confront 
the apartheid regime in South Africa for commercial reasons. 
The German government opposed the EEC's resolution on sanc-
tions against South Africa in 1985， especially the Community's 
ban on imports of coal. For more discussion of Bonn-Pretoria 
relations， see Zdenek Cervenka and Barbara Rogers， 主he一主止
cIear Axis: Secret Collaboration between West Germany and 
South Africa (London: ]ulian Friedmann Books). 
同 ]epma，主坦Tyi旦gof主坦， pp.33，42，45. 
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valuation in the 1960 s by using increased development assistance to 
promote capital exports， the policy resulted in an expansion of ex-
ports of goods and services. Partly because of its concern about cur-
rency appreciation， the powerful Money and Credit Section of the 
Ministry of Economics apparently opposed a sudden increase of tied 
aid from 9 percent to 55 percent in 1963.1il1 
4. INTERNATIONAL POSITIONS AND DEVELOPMENT COOp.“ 
ERATION POLlCIES 
Systemic vulnerability has been a necessary condition in the de-
velopment of ]apan's high sensitivity to structural change in the in‘ 
同 Tosupplement Table ， in1966， approximately 82% of the cred“ 
its granted to developing countries flowed back in the form of 
purchase orders to the German economy. Holbik and Myers， 
West German F oreign Aid， p.4l. 1n 1984， the turnover ratio was 
sti1l as high as 75%， although West Germany tied only 21% of 
its financial aid to purchases of German goods. The German 
主豆E旦竺， 22 September， 1985， No.1l96， p.6. For more detai!ed 
figures on the German procurement rate， see May， Schumachen， 
and Malek，住空笠盟企id，pp.36-38， 66-71 for 60 s and 70 s ; 
Holbik and Myers， West German Foreign Aid， p.41， Arnold， 1m-
plementing Developing Assist旦旦主主， p.32; Knusel， West German 
出Q，p.45 for the early 60 s; Brigitte H. Sch凶z，“The'New' 
Germany and the Third World: Aspects of a Changing Rela-
tionship，" in WiIiam D. Graf ed.， The 1nternationalization of 
the German PoIitical Economy: E哩担也旦 of 豆旦~~型盟主
丘封ect(New York: St. Martin's Press， 1992)， p.237 for the 
1970 s. In general EC donors'“unofficial" tied aid， at around 
70%， has been relatively high by international standards. 
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ternational economy. Since the end of the Second World War， ]a-
pan has consistently been vulnerable， not only because of asymme-
tries with specific countries， such as dependence on United States 
markets or Middle Eastern oil， but more importantly， because the 
]apanese economy would not function without the existing global 
system of international trade and capital. This systemic vulnerabil目
ity was set up by the United States in the early post-war period of 
the 1940 s and 50 s. Since then the international economic regimes 
led by the United States have been the fundamental base on which 
]apan's development cooperation policy has been built. In contrast， 
Germany's systemic vulnerability since the end of the war has been 
almost negligible， because the German economy has been enmeshed 
in intra-industry trade and investment among industrialized Euro-
pean countries which have agreed to institutionalize intra市regional
economic transactions. 
A. ]apan in the World Economy 
??
帥 MichaelKreile，“West Germany: The Dynamics of Expan-
sion，" in Peter ]. Katzenstein， ed.， B，etween Power and Plenty: 
Foreign Economic Policy 0f Advanced Industrial States (Madi-
son: The University of Wisconsin Press， 1978)， p.214; ]ohn 
White， German Aid: A Survey of the Sources， Policy and 
Structure of German Aid (London: The Overseas Development 
Institute Ltd.， 1965)， p.112. The BMZ's policy statement an-
nounced in 1975 stated that “お10netarypolicy can be no substi-
tute for development policy; financing development assistance 
by monetary measures should， therefore， be avoided." BMZ， D吃ー
主lopmentPolicy of並立FRG(Bonn: BMZ， 1975)， p.4l. 
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]apan's international position is an outcome of the American 
attempt， during the late 1940 s and 50 s， tocreate an American-Ied 
triangular integration of ]apan， the United States， and Southeast 
Asian countries. The triangle was， however， hierachical， with the 
United States at the apex， ]apan beneath the US， and Southeast 
Asia at the bottom. American policy-makers expected integration 
both to boost Southeast Asian industrialism and accelerate ]apan's 
economic recovery and to produce favorable spill-over effects on 
regional security in Asia.1岨 Itwas within this framework that ]a-
pan， as the factory of Asia， was able to export capital goods to 
Southeast Asia in the name of economic cooperation and import 
needed raw materials， and the United Stat回 providedboth open 
markets for ]apanese semi-finished goods and financial and hu-
manitarian aid to devastated economies in Asia. Dean Acheson， 
George Kennan， and ]ohn Foster Dul1es effectively managed and 
determined the structure in which ]apan's foreign policy in general， 
and development cooperation policy in particular， was shaped dur-
ing the 1950s. ]apanese leaders during this time， such as Kijuro 
Shidehara， Shigeru Y oshida and Hitoshi Ashida， aIlof whom were 
同 ]ohnDower， Empire and Aftermath， p.415-27; Wil1iam S. Bor-
den， The Pacific Alliance: United States Foreign Economic 
p'olicy and ]apanese Trade Recovery， 1947-1955 (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Pr白鳥 1984);Bruce Cumings，“The 
Origins and Development of the Northeast Asian Political 
Economy: Industrial Seetors， Product Cycles， and Political 
Consequences，" in Frederic C. Deyo， The Political Economy of 





InternationaJ Positions and DeveJopmcnt Coperation PoJicy in ]apan and Germany (Katol 
experienced former diplomats and intenationalists， accepted Japan's 
role as a non-paying passenger on the ship of the international sys-
tem and took advantage of economic cooperation to foster Japan's 
economlc recovery. 
The American decision to integrate Japan into the triangle was 
based loosely on the liberal capitalist ideal. When America revised 
its grand strategy in 1949， replacing Franklin Roosevelt's“one-
world" based on an international liberal order with the goal of con-
taining the communist bloc， Washington policy-makers sought to 
solidifying security in Asia_ Dean Acheson devised a second-best 
strategy of seeking regional security in Asia， which was described 
as a“great crescent" stretching from J apan through Southeast Asia 
and around India， ultimately to the oil fields of the Persian Gulf_ 
Like Germany in Europe， Japan was expected to be the workshop 
of Asia.(19) Promoting Japan's economic recovery and the expected 
spill-over into Southeast Asian countries was simply a part of an 
American grand-strategy， which included reducing Great Britain's 
dollar debt and relieving French burdens in Indo-China.醐 Kennan
was assigned the job of reversing the course origninally set by 
Acheson. He urged an end to purges of Japanese war criminals， the 
immediate necessity of a bilateral U.S. -Japan peace treaty， and the 
minimization of war reparations_ By the beginning of 1949， the 
American policy had moved beyond passive c∞ont泊ainmer凶1託ttωo positive 
2 “加"rol印叫01伽 C γ i加n附 ponse to c∞ommunis 
九
五同 BruceCumings，“Japan's Position in the World System，" in An-
dre Gordon， ed.， Postwar Japan as History (Berkely: Univer-
sity of California Press， 1993)， p.:39-40. 
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Asia. The policy revision culminated in N ational Security Council 
document number 48， so called NSC 48， in which a hierachical 
structure of the regional economies was laid out， with America at 
the core， Japan in the semi-periphery， and South Korea， Taiwan， 
Southeast Asia， and others on the Periphery. Bruce Cumming ex-
plains that : 
A draft [of the document] referred to“certain advan叩
tages in production costs of various commodities" in 
the United States， Japan， and Southeast Asia， which 
“suggest the mutual1y beneficial character of trade of a 
triangular character between these three areas." In 
other words， this theory of comparative advantage and 
the product cycle eloborated a tripartite hierachy of 
American core heavy industries， Japanese light indus-
tries and heavy industries revived to acceptable ceil-
ings， and peripheral raw mater匂Isand markets. 
The transpacific linkage between Asia and the United States was 
consolidated by Dulles who joined the Truman administration in 
1950 and maintained an internationalism that looked on Japan as a 
6ゆ Fora useful discussion of the revision of American foreign pol-
icy in the late 1940 s and 50 s， see Andrew Jon Rotter， The Path 
to Vietnam: Origins of the.American Commitment to South-
east Asia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press， 198η， especially， 
pp.5-7， 38-44， 138-39， 166-84; G. John Ikenberry，“Rethinking 
the Origins of American Hegemo町"Political Scienc旦企盟E
terly， 104，3 (Fall 1989)， 375-400; Benjamin ]. Cohen，“The 
Revolution in Atlantic Relations: A Bargain Comes Unstuck，" 
in Wolfram F. Hanrieder， ed.， The United States and Western 
Europe: Political， Economic and Strategic Perspectives (Cam-
bridge， Mass.: Winthrop Publishers， 1974); Robert Gilpin， U.S. 
Power and the Multinational Cοrporation: The Political Econ-
omy of Foreign Direct Investment (N ew Y ork: Basic， 1975). 
?????
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junior partner of the United States and England.$11 
The Eisenhower administration abjured the roll-back strategy 
following the disastrous Korean War. In order to secure Japan's 
political stability and pro…Western orientation， itopted to open 
American markets to Japan. In Asia， trade between Japan and 
China was stagnant， despite relaxed export controls， and the Sout~­
east Asian countries were not reliable markets for Japanese goods， 
due to insufficient purchasing power.側 OutsideAsia， almost half of 
the GATT's members invoked safeguard provisions against Japa-
nese exports in the mid-1950 s. Even after Japan's admission to 
GA TT as a contracting party in 1955， 14 countries， including the 
United Kingdom， France， the Netherlands， Belgium， Australia， In-
dia， and New Zealand， which accounted for about 40 percent of Ja嶋
pan's exports to GA TT members， invoked Article 35 and refused to 
have GATT relations with Japan. Even though they joined later 
than Japan， many former colonies of the United Kingdom and 
France used the same safeguard against Japan. While Canada， West 
Germany， ltaly and the Scandinavian coutries gave Japan most-fa-
vored-nation (MFN) treatment， the U.S. had the only market reli-
able enough to support the revival of the J apanese economy after 
the end of the “special procurements" of the Korean War.ω 
Economic asssitance from international organizations and the 
???(51) This part draws upon Cumings，“Japan's Position，" pp.39-52. 
The quotation is from p.45. 
(52) Sayuri Shimizu，“Creating People of Plenty: The United States 
and Japan's Economic Alternatives， 1953-58，" Ph.D. disserta-
tion， Cornell University， 1991. 
? ?
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United States to Japan， and from Japan to developing countries was 
initiated within the triangle of the United States， Japan and Asia. 
Japan joinedthe World Bank in 1952， four years before becoming a 
member of the United Nations. Membership enabled Japan to ob-
tain concessional loans from the Bank to rebuild its infrastructure 
and reconstruct its economy. Economic assistance from Japan be-
gan on a limited scale in 1952， when Japan contributed $80，000 to 
the United Nations Expanded Program of Technical Assistance 
(UNEPTA)， a predecessor of the United Nations Development Pro-
gram. In 1954， Japan， with the help of the United States， became a 
donor member of the Colombo Plan for Co-operative Economic De-
velopment in South and Southeast Asia， which had been set up in 
1950 to coordinate economic assistance activities in the Common除
wealth countries.帥 Participationin the Columbo Plan is officially 
recognized by the J apanese government as the official beginning of 
Japanese foreign aid. Japan awarded its first official aid loan in 
1958. The first loan went to India because a U.S.-led group of West-
ern donor countries established the first World Bank consultative 
consortium for India in that year.附 Japan was also pushed into the 
Development Cooperation Group (DAG) of the OECD in 1961 (which 
6功 Onthe difficulty Japanese exports had in penetrating Europe 
and the vital importance of the Al11erican l11arket to Japan in 
the 1950 s， see Ryutaro KOl11iya and Motoshige Ito，“Japan's In-
ternational Trade and Trade Policy， 1955-1984，" in Okimoto 
and Inoguchi， eds.， Political Ecοnomy of Japan， Vo1.I， pp.178-
79; Borden， The Pacific Alliance， pp.170-71， 179-80. 
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was later renamed the Development Coopεration COl11mittce， or 
DAC) before it was admitted into the OECD in 1964. The LJnited 
States used the DAC to put pressure on .Japan to expand economic 
cooperation in Asia. For example， in 1965 the DAC and the United 
States urged .Japan to increase aid to Taiwan and South Korea. 
The United States also encouraged .Japan to take the lead in form-
ing an international consortiul11 for lndonesia in 1966， which was 
later called the 1nter-Governmental Group on lndonesia (1GGI)， to 
support lhe new Suharto regime.州
一-Trade--
The vertical and horizontal extent of Japanese international 
trade provides us a measure of .Japan's interdependence in the post 
war period. 1n terms of both geographical extension and inclusion 
of countries in different development stages， Japan's trade has been 
demonstrably l110re internationalized than that of any other indus-
trialized country. As Table 2 shows， Japanese trade， since the 1960 
s， has been almost equaIly with industrialized OECD countries and 
developing non-OECD countries and has reached regions irrespec-
tive of distance. North Al11erica， particularly the United States， 
and Asia have been major markets， and the current resurgence of 
Asia as J apan's biggest trade partner is part of a pattern as Asia 
and North America have alternated in that position: Asia led in 
~ 1960， 75， 80 and North America in 65， 70， 85， 90. While Europ開eIぬs泊
五
3 附 Mori，“ThePolitical Economy，" p.67. 
同 Mori，“ThePolitical Economy，" p.76. 
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creasingly important as economic inte只rationadvances and ]apan 
stilI relies on crude oil imports from the Middle East， litle change 
has occured to the structure of ]apanese trade in the 1990 s. ]apan's 
extensive trade relations with north and sou~hJ and east and west 
are in striking contrast with those of Germany， which have per日is-
tently inclined toward indu日trialized，European state日， which have 
accounted for 60 to 70 percent of total German trade. 
When we look at sectors such as technology and service日， the 
leaders in current trends in international trade， the global character 
of ]apan's interdependence continues to be conspicuous. Along with 
overseas tourism， technoloεy licences made ]apan the leading defi‘ 
cit country in service trade in 1992.1571 Bilateral trade with the 
United States stil dominates ]apan's technology trade， but develop同
ing countries account for the majority of technology royalty re-
ceipts. For example， royalty payments for American licensed tech-
nology were three times receipts in 1987; developing countries paid 
around 60 percent of ]apan's royalties in 1980， while Germany re-
ceived less than 10 percent of royalties from that source， and the 
United States， about 20 percent. ]apan has been selling more tech-
nology than it imports since the early 1970 s; ]apan was the only 
industrialized country to register an increase in the number of pat-
ents per scientist and engineer between 1967 and 1984， although the 
例主主空hiShi空包旦， May 18， 1994， satelIite 13 th. edition， p.8. During 
1987-92， global trade of goods increased by 56%， while service 
trade was up by 72%. Service trade accounted for 28% of world 
trade in 1992. For a detailed analysis of service trade， se吃
Tsusho Sangyosho (MITI)， Tsusho Hakusho [White Paper on 
TradeJ， 1994. 
?????
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overall balance of technology-related payments was stil negative 
as of 1989.ωAs ]apanese multinationals' foreign investments in-
crease， especially in the United States and Asian countries， technol-
ogy transfer between home companies and foreign subsidiaries has 
been growing. 
-Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)ー
Like international trade， ]apanese FDI also embodies the 
state's reliance on global-scale interdependence.ωUnlike trade， FDI 
enhances vertical， not horizontal， integration of the ]apanese econ-
omy in the world economy. Thus vulnerablity to the collapse of the 
existing international liberal order derives from the economic logic 
of an international division of labor based upon dynamic compara-
tive advantage. Overall， ]apanese FDI has been associated with 
structural change in the ]apanese economy. That is， as Table 3 de-
scribes， the regional distribution of ]apanese FDI has shifted from 
developing to industrialized countries， asthe ]apanese economy has 
become “sophisticated，" changing its orientation from heavy indus-
try-centered to high-tech and intelligence. Thus ]apan's economic 
maturation from a capital importer to an exporter has involved the 
relative demotion even of Asia in the global context. 
五
五
(58) Samuels，“Rich Nation Strong Army''; Mark Borthwick， r.生
cific Century: The Emergence of Modern Pacific Asia (Boul-
der: Westview Press， 1992)， p.515; UNCTC， Transnational 
Corporations! 1988， p.177; OECD， 0ECD Science and Technol-
ogy Indicators Report No.3， R&D， Production and Diffusion of 
Technology (Paris: OECD， 1989)， pp.9， 11; The Economist， 
May 22， 1993， p.91. 
??
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As in the late 1930 s， when Manchuria recieved 70 percent of 
]apan's FDI， during the 1960 s and 70 s， ]apan concentrated FDI in 
developing countries t:o acquire and process raw materials for ex; 
port to ]apan. For example， in1971， while German firms had only 
40 percent of their foreign manufacturing in less developed coun四
tri田， over 90 percent of over5eas ] apanese manufacturers were 10-
cated in developing countries.冊 Untilthe 1970 s，出eannual amount 
of FDI was quite small， arol1nd $200 to 300 million. Because the 
] apanese Cl1rrent aCCOl1nt tl1rned to surpll1s in the late 19605， the 
倒 Internationalcomparison of FDI data stil requires careful at-
tention by researchers， because of statistical problems related 
to the definition. According to the IMF， FDI is “investment that 
is made to acquire a lasting interests in an enterprise operating 
in an economy other than that of investor， the investor's pur-
pose being to have an effective voice in the management of the 
enterprise." Since this definition creats a grey zone between 
FDI and portfolio investment， the OECD suggested that a hold-
ing of 10% or more of the shares or voting stock should be the 
benchmark definition of FDI. However， the actual minimum 
ownership level for FDI varies by county. For example， itis 
25% for Germany， 20% for thβUK and France， and 10% for 
the US and ]apan. The OECD also suggested that FDI figures 
should include reinvested earnings， which are earnings made by 
foreign affiliates excluding dividends or remittances to their 
parent companies. The US， the UK and Germany follow this 
suggestion， whiIe ]apan and France do not.ーIchiroAkimune， 
“Overview: ]apan's Direct Investment in the EC，" in The Su-
mitomo-Life Research Institute， ]apanese Direct Investment in 
Europe: Motives， Impact， and PoIicy Implication (Aldershot: 
Avebl1ry， 1991)， pp.1-2. ln my discussion， FDI data is intra--
country as ml1ch as possible， unless reliable data are avaiIable 
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Foreign Exchange and Control Law， which was enacted in 1949， 
was substantially relaxed in 1972， and Japan's capital outflows were 
almost l1nrestricted. 1972 is often mentioned as出eyear one of 
Japanese FDI. With official backing from Foreign Investment In-
surance since 1970， revision of tax provisions for investment losses， 
and the Export-Import Banks' financial support， the total oversea号
investment in the four years 1973-76 was nearly double that of出e
preceding twenty years.ω 
As Japan has become a capital rich country， industrialized 
countries in both North America and Europe have become major 
destinations of Japanese FDI. While the volume rocketed to arol1nd 
$50 billion in the late 1980 s， developing countries' share inJapanese 
FDI shrank from 53 percent to 24 percent between 1980 and 1991; 
together the United States and Europe c1aimed 61 percent of cumu-
lative Japanese FDI from 1951 to 1991.倒Whilethe United Stat田
has been the dominant recipient， European countries， especially Ger-
many， have been increasing in importance as partners. Until the 
early 1970 s， J apan's FDI in Europe was concentrated in .finance and 
おゆ Lawrence G. Franko， The European Multinationals: A Re-
newed Challenge to American and British Big Business (Stam-
ford， COOl1.: Greylock Publishers， 1978)， p.109. 
制 T.].Pempel，“From Exporter to Investor: Japanese Foreign 
Economic Policy，" in Gerald L. Curtis， ed.， Japan's Foreign Pol-
icy after the Cοld War: Coping with Change (Armonk， N ew 
York: M.E. Sharpe， 1993)， p.1l6; Ryutaro Komiya and Ryuhei 
Wakasugi，“Japan's Foreign Direct Investment，" Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science， No. 513 
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trading in order to raise funds in the Euro-doIlar markets and in-
crease exports in the region. After that period， relatively low wage 
rates and access the Europen market， resulted in increased invest-
ment in manufacturing， especially in England. As the European inte-
gration process advances， ]apanese investment has been shifting to 
Germany in al sectors， including finance， research and manufactur-
ing. During 1988-90， investment in Germany increased by a factor of 
three from $400 mi1lion to $1，200 mi1lion. The joint venture agree-
ment between Mitsubishi group and the Dailmer Benz in 1990 sym-
bolized the increasing importance of Europe to ]apanese business.ω 
]apanese FDI has been often characterized as“aggressive" in 
the sense that the targeting of industries and regions has been con-
sciously harmonized with structural change in the domestic econ雄
omy. The more normal“reactive" strategy allows the timing and 
direction of FDI to be determined by the stage of development and 
the product cycle in importing countries. The ]apanese state per-
ceives the interdependent global economy as being hierarchically 
?????
制) Intereconomics， May/]une 1993， p.124; ]ames C. Abegglen， Sea 
Change: Pacific Asia as the New World Industrial Center 
(New York: Free Press， 1994)， p.212. 
お功 Stephen Thomsen and Phedon Nicolaides， The Evolution of 
]apanese Direct Investment in Europe: Death of a Transister 
Salesman (New York: Harvester Whβatsheof， 1991); Sueo 
Sekiguchi，“]apanese Direct Invetment in Europe，" in Loukas 
Tsoukalis and Maureen 羽市ite，eds.， ]apan and Western 
Europe: Conflict anιCooperation (N ew Y ork: St. Martin's 
Press， 1982)， pp.162--72; Henri-Claude de Bettignies，“]apan 
and E.C. 92，" in Garby and Bullock，吋s.，担盟主， p.86 
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comprised of two worlds: industrialized countries and developing 
countries. The two worlds， according to J apanese views， are linked 
by the international division of labor. Japan's foreign economic 
policies， accordingly， must change as Japan shifts from a develop. 
ing to an industrialized economy. During the 1950 s and 60 s， when 
Japan received economic assistance from the World Bank， the ma. 
jor concern was to improve Japan's weak position in the interna-
tional division of labor. Economically， defeat in the war meant not 
only relegation to developing status but also a loss of the benefits 
derived from the international division of labor. The Japanese gov-
ernment believed that the state had become weak after the war， be-
cause it had lost 
foreign territories and spheres of influence [which] had 
been for some time brought into a division-of-labor re-
lationship with [Japan]. . [T] he foundation for the 
development of a peaceful Japanese economy wiI be 
greatly weakened by the loss of profits from industrial 
diversification within spheres of influence， unless it be-
comes possible to trade freely， without regard for na-
tional boundaries.制
In this context， other developing countries were regarded as simply 
competors， which might threaten Japan with their catch-up indus-
tries. MITI regarded the catch-ups as the“dilemma of foreign aid" 
and proposed to provide government support to sectors such as in四
fant industries， smalI-and medium-sized companies and agriculture， 
which were exposed to competition from developing countries.(65) 
This careful protection of domestic industries changed as J apan 
graduated from the group of economically developing countries. 
Since the 1970 s， MITI 110 longer regards economic cooperatiol1 as 
???
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threatening a possible boomerang effect， but has tarted to accept it 
as a means of encouraging the further advancement of ]apan's in-
dustrial structures within the international division of labor.鮒 The
oil crises confirmed the nation's position as a r田ource-poorbut 
capital-rich country. A MITI official noted that: 
[The basic idea] behind our resource diplomacy is to 
meet people and make thing work.. [Japan] has the 
technology， the capital and human resources to make 
us increasingly indispensable to developing countries 
who need our help.16l 
Therefore， the common arguments出atthe ]apanese economy 
entered the age of FDI after the year one of ]apanese FDI， in1972， 
or following the Plaza Accord of 1985 ignores the aggressive char-
acter of ]apanese FDI. ]apan has used FDI aggressively since the 
1950 s. Until the 1970 s， FDI was largely directed to resource devel-
?????
制 Quotedin Akio Watanabe，“Southeast Asia in U.S寸ap叩lese
Relations，" in Akira Iriye and Warren 1. Cohen， eds.， The 
United States and ]apan in the Postwar World (Lexington， 
Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky， 1989)， p.84 from 
Gaimusho Chosa-kyoku， Nihon Keizai Saiken no Kihonmondai 
[Basic Problems for the Reconstruction of ]apanese Economy] ， 
(September 1946)， p.42. 
(65) Tsusho Sangyosho， Keizai Kyoryoku， 1964， p.42; 1968， p.141; 
1969， p.l05. 
(66) Tsusho Sangyosho， Keizai Kyoryoku， 1971， p.125; 1977， p.l74; 
1978， p.89. While出ischange in MITl's view of ]apan's position 
within the international division of labor first surfaced in a 
1971 state叩:entthat protection for domestic industries should 
not retard developing countries' economic development， a clear 
rejection of the protectionist idea waited until the late 1970 s. 
制 FarEastern Economic Review， September 28， 1979， p.64. 
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opment in Asia， including oil in North Sumatra， iron ore in Malay-
sia， the Philippines， and India， copper ore in the PhiIippines， and 
natural gas in Brunei. During the 1960 s mining and related manu勾
facturing took 30 percent and 25 percent respectively of total in-
vestmenL While natural resouce-related investment continued in 
the 1970 s (and expanded to non-Asian resources such as oil in the 
Middle East， bauxite in Brazil， cooper in central Africa and coal in 
western Canada) a shift to manufacturing occured in that period. 
Since the 1980 s， developing countries have provided cheap labor for 
Japanese assembly industries such as home electronics and automo-
biles. According to MITI's survey of almost 9，000 Japanese afili-
ates overseas， 64 percent of Japanese companies in Asia ranked the 
region's cheap labor as the most important incentive for investing 
in the area， while in N orth America and Europe the promotion of 
local sales was the first reason.側 Japan's remarkably consistent and 
pragmatic bilateral bargaining with the the United States in such 
sectors as textiles， steel， consumer electronics， and automobile has 
not only contributed to keeping the world economy open to Japa-
nese exports but has aIso provided breathing space for Japanese in-
dustries while they shift production to developing countries.側
制 Komiyaand Wakasugi，“Japan's Foreign Direct Investment，" 
p.51; Tsusho Sangyosho， Keizai Kyoryoku， 1992， pp.89-90. As 
a case of emerging intra-industry trade in the wake of Japan's 
FDI in Asia， see Peter A. Petri's description of auto industries 
in Asia，“The East Asian Trading Bloc: An AnalyticaI His-
tory，" in Frankel and Kahler eds.， Regionalism and Rivalry， 
pp.41-43. 
?????
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B. German Economy Embedded in Europe 
German economy has been， since the outset of the post-war pe 
riod， deeply and widely embedded in the regional economy of 
Europe， in which international economic exchanges among rela骨
tively highly industrialized countries are institutionalized at a su-
pranational or inter-governmental level. Under these regional insti-
tutions， the German economy has been sheltered from interdepend-
ence shocks derived from the world economy， and thus its systemic 
vulnerability has been consistently lower than ]apan's. Conse-
quently， Germany's regional economic entanglement has been litt1e 
informed by the necessity of responding to structural change in the 
international economy. 
The scope of German economic interdependence has been much 
narrower than that of ]apan for the whole period after the Second 
World War. The German economy's engagement with external 
economies has been regional and based upon intra-industry trade 
and investment. Thanks to strong intra-Europe economic institu-
tions that ranged from the European Payment Union (EPU) in the 
1950 s， a multilateral clearance system of trade-related payment， to
the European Monetary System (EMS) since the late 1970 s， a man-
??
制~ On unlimited negotiations and their positive effects on eco・
nomic openess， see Oye， Economic Discrimination and Political 
Exc担盟主ニ Fora succinct summary of ]apanese trade str間-
gies， see Peter J. Katzenstein，“Regions in Competition: Com-
parative Advantages of America， Europe， and Asia，" in Haften-
dorn and Tuschhoff， eds.， America and Europe in an Era of 
生担監， pp.1l6-117. 
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aged exchange rate mechanism to create a zone of stability， the 
German economy has been set within the regional econoy and insu-
lated from disturbances in global interdependence. In contrast to Ja-
pan's global-scope international position between Western industri-
alized and Asian developing countries， the German economy has 
been situated in a single layered European sphere by institutional-
ized exogenous forces. 
Access to the large and stable market in Western Europe was 
essential for Germany's economic reconstruction following the war， 
and participation in European integration was the precondition for 
that access， which was needed to compensate for the loss of pre-
war eastern European markets.1U1 Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's be-
lief that“The German question can only be solved under a Euro-
pean roof" was largely shaped by economic， political and security 
conditions in Europe immediately after the warω 
In integrating Germany into Western Europe， the United States 
played a less direct role than it had in Asia. In the former it took 
“patronal leadership"， while exercising “remote control" in the lat-
ter.G2J In Europe， the U.S. limited itself to being a benign investor， 
providing seed money for regional institutions to deepen economic 
同 CharlesMaier， ed.， The Marshall Plan and Germany: West 
German Development within the Framework' of the European 
Recovery Program (New York: Berg， 1991); Michael J. 
Hogan， The Marshall Plan: America， Britain， and the Recon-
stuction of Western Europe， 1947-1952 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press， 1987)， especially pp. 287-90. 
??
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integration， rather than directly helping to create trade and invest崎
ment relations. Funds were granted through the so called Marshall 
Plan (1947-52)， formally the European Recovery Plan (ERP)， topro-
vide American credits to compensate for Europe's massive dollar 
deficit. Secretary of State Marshall said “This [economic recoveryJ 
is the business of the Europeans. The initiatives， 1 think， mu司t
come from Europe.哨 Ofthe institutions created with American 
sponsorship and European initiative， the EPU contributed most to 
German integration into Western Europe. The EPU led to currency 
convertibility in the late 1950 s and to the Common Market in the 
1960 s， both of which cemented Germany's international postion in 
West Europe. 
The MarshaIl Plan aid provided seed money to build regional 
institutions through which the Germans could become Europeans 
without raising fears among West European countries， especiaIly 
France， of restored German economic autarky and asymmetrical in-
(71) Quoted in a speech by the Ambassador of the FRG， Juergen 
Ruhfus，“The Role of the United Germany in. the United 
Europe，" in German Information Center， Statements & 
包住生笠， March6，1叩99引1，p.3 
U功 Theterm ‘“‘'pa抗trona叫1leadership" is from Klaus Knorr， The 
Power of Nations:The Political Economy of International Re-
lations (N ew York: Basic Books， 1975)， pp.25-26.“Remote con-
trol" was quoted in Cumings，“Japan's Position in the World 
五 System，"p.40. 
四川 Quotedin William Diebold， J r.， Trade and Payments in West. 
ern Europe: A Study in Economic Cooperation 1947-51 (New 
46 Y ork: Harper & Brothers for Council on Foreign Relations， 
1952)， p.4. 
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terdependence. That is， on1y by building regional economic institu-
tions， could America make Germany's economic recovery and its 
political integration within vミrestern Europe compatibleY~ In this 
context， the systemic effects of the Marshall P1an on the German 
intemational position are much more important than its economic 
effects on the German recovery.ωMore specifically， the Marshall 
Plan and other economic assistance from the United States p1ayed 
crucia1 roles in establishing the institutions that embedded the Ger-
man economy in Western Europe， particu1arly throl1gh the export 
of manufactured goods that replaced American products. 1n the 
words of Charles Maier， the Marshall Plan“served， ina sense， like 
the lubricant in an engine ηot the fue1--allowing a machine to rl1n 
that wou1d otherwise buckle and bind."刊
The EPU was one of the institutions of the Marshall P1an pe-
riod most crucia1 in determining the German internationa1 position. 
付 A similar argume此 canbe found in John Gimbel，主he旦豆亙i旦of
the Marshall Plan (Stanford: Stanford University Press， 1976) ; 
Michael J. Hogan，“European 1ntegration and German Reinte-
gration: Mar由al Planners and the Search for Recovery and 
Security in Western El1rope，" in Maier， ed.， The MarshalI Plan 
and Germany， pp.115-70. 
(J5) For a helpfuI discussion of the macro-and micro-economic ef-
fects of the MarshaIl Plal1 011 German economic recovery， see 
Werner Abelshauser，“American Aid and West German Eco-
nomic Recovery: A Macro配 onomicPerspective，" in Maier， 
ed.， The Marshall Plan and Gern型ly，pp.367-409; and Knut 
Borchardt and Christoph Buchheim，“The Marshall Plan and 
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Michel Hogan described the EPU as“出eplan's greatest triumph.川m
The EPU， established in 1950， was a multilateral clearing house de-
signed to facilitate intra-European trade. Before 1950， intra-Euro-
pean trade and payments were based upon bilateral agreements or 
on a sophisticated form of intemational barter， both of which 
blocked smooth flows of commoditities within Europe. The first in-
itiative to expand bilateraI payment agreements into a multilateral 
system of intra-European payments came in 1947 from the Benelux 
countries. The beginning of the MarshalJ Plan gave the program 
new momentum by shifting the debate over multilateraIization of 
payments to discussion of the multiI ateral use of the MarshaIl 
funds.側 Underthe EPU， various claims and obIigations arising from 
intra-regional trade were settIed exclusively by a country's overaIl 
postion toward aIl other trade partners， regardless of its eamings 
and expenditures. Debts of less than a certain amount were com-
pletely covered by an automatic grant of credit through a common 
pool. If the debt exeeded the credit grant， as in the German crisis in 
1950， part of it was covered by credits and part by payments of gold 
or dolJars. The United Stat回 providedthe common pool with $350 
milIion of capital， which was used to give credit lines to deficit 
???
同 CharlesS. Maier， 1nSearch of StabiIty: Explanations in His-
torical PoliticaI E乙onomy(Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press， 198η， p.173. 
Uカ Hogan，The MarshalJ Plan， p.293. 
同 RobertTriffin， European and the Money Muddle: From Bilat-
eralism to Near-Convertibility， 1947-56 (N ew Haven: Yale 
University Press， 1957)， pp.147 and 151. 
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countries. American aid paid 22 percent of net settlements during 
the period of the German crisis in 1950-51. The administration of 
settlements was carried out by a multilateral European organiza田
tion， the Bank for International Settlements (BIS)， with cooperation 
from the central banks of the participating countries. The multilat-
eral clearing mechanism provided substantial incentives to member 
countries to eliminate al discriminatory practices in trade. By Au-
gust 1956， 89 percent of intra-European imports had been freed of 
al quantitative restrictions， while in ]apan， only 16 percent of im・
ports came in without tarifsY91 Since， unlike the IMF， the BIS did 
not require member countries to deposit gold or hard currencies to 
overcome their balance of payment problems， the EPU laid the fun-
damental basis for currency convertibility. 
The U.S. --backed multilateral trade payments mechanism not 
only resolved Europe's chronic dollar and gold shortages and led to 
the convertiblity of European currencies， italso transformed the al-
most closed German economy into one of the most open economies 
in Western Europe. Western Europe's dollar deficts from 1945 to 
1948 was directly related to Germany's inability to export capital 
goods within Europe at a time when the reconstruction boom 
(79) NHK Shuzaihan， Nihon， Doitsu--Futatsu no Sengo Kei zai [J a回
pan and Germany: Two Postwar Histories] (Tokyo : Nihon 
Hoso Shuppan Kyokai， 1988)， pp.76 and 88; Raymond Frech 
Mikesell， Foreign Exchange in the Postwar World (New York: 
Twentieth Century Fund， 1954)， pp.100-133; Diebold， T旦坐
但立E笠旦旦~， pp.87-132; Triffin，血盟主 andthe Money Mud圃
dle， pp.168-207 (figures are quoted from pp.203 and 207). 
?????
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swelled demand for capital goods from the United States. American 
policy-makers calculated that “Reintegrating Germany into the pat-
tern of international [trade] would reduce the do11ar deficts and al-
low a rapid reduction in Marshall Aid， would accelerate the eco. 
nomic recovery elsewhere in Western Europe， would reduce the bur-
den of Germany on the American public purse and， above al， would 
tie it politically to the West." Althol1gh the EPU was in conflict 
with the Bretton Woods goal of creating a world-wide multilateral 
trade and payments system， and divided the world into two sepa. 
rate currency blocs (the Western European countries and their ex-
tra-European currency areas on the one hand， and the dollar zone 
on the other)， Germany was“locked in" the regional system. Fur. 
thermore， discrimination against dollar imports was extensive until 
the mid 1950 s， when the Organization for El1ropean Economic Co-
operation (OEEC)， the predecesor of the OECD， relaunched trade 
liberalization programs.側
The EPU's effect on German trade was striking. In the late 
1940 s， Germany， under leadership of Economics Minister Ll1dwig 
Erhard， was trying to transform its export structure from depen-
dance on raw materials， especially coal， to reliance on manufac. 
tured products. KnoiNアnas the Godfather of the German economic 
miracle dl1ring the 1950 s， Erhard removed almost a1 government 
controls over the German economy. However， as structural change ? ? ? ?
50 
制 AlanS. Mi口lwa訂rdι，
Tra苛de，"in Ma討ie官r，ed.， The Marshall Plan and Germany， p.453-
54， 478. 
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progressed， the Gennan economy needed to import aも，videvariety 
of raw materials and semi-finished goods. Foodstuffs and raw ma-
terials accounted for 45 and 30 percent of German imports in 1950. 
When prices of raw materials rose sharply after the outbrak of the 
Korean War， German purchases， primarily from sterling bloc coun-
tries covered by the EPU， exhausted its credit in 1950. The United 
States replenished the fund with an additional $120 million， follow-
ing Acheson's policy on the EPU that“the US will back them up." 
Germany became the first recipient of the special credit beyond the 
set quota. Thnaks to the American assistance， the German econ-
omy started to run surpluses with other European countries by 1952. 
German exports grew at average annual rate of 30 percent between 
1950 and 54; Germany's production index rose from 87 in July 1949 
to 137 in July 1952.制
The Western European market dominated German interna. 
tional trade during the 1950 s. Three-quarters of manufactured ex時
ports went there in 1951， 60 percent in 1959. Exports to North 
America were quantitatively unimportant， making up 15 percent 
and 19 percent of European Exports in the same years.ωThe major 
importers of German goods were not members of the European 
。1) Thomas Schwartz， '‘Europeal1 Integration and the 'Social Rela-
tiol1ship': Implementating the Marshall Plan in the Federal Re-
public，" in Maier， ed.， Th~.坦主生d旦旦a民生型塑l， pp.205 
12 (Qotation is from p.206.); Jentlesοn，主主立E並出旦ePol出空，
p.70; Karl Hardach， The Political Economy of Ger旦旦且由
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Coal and Steel Community ( ECSC) but other European states which 
belonged to the EPU bl1t were to become members of the future 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA). In spite of their mem-
bership in the ECSC and their eventual signing of the Treaty of 
Rome， France and ltaly protected their markets more vigorously 
than did Germany's smaller industrialized neighbors. Austria， BeI-
gium， the Netherlands， Norway， Sweden and Switzerland imported 
large amounts of capital equipment such as machinery， transport 
equipment， chemicals and metals， from the Federal Republic during 
the investment boom of the 1950 s. II1 the early 1950 s， these highly 
industrialized small European countries absorbed one third to 40 
percent of increases in German exports. The EPU made this possi-
ble. Demand from Brazil， South Africa， and other extra-region 
countries for German capital equipment was much less stable than 
that from Western Europe， partly because bilateral trade agree-
口1entsdid not present the same opportunity for uninterrupted ex-
ports as did the multilateral mechanism of the EPU.制)
Germany's international economic interdependence continued to 
evolve within the region after the high growth period of the 1950 s. 
Hans-Dietrich Genscher， who served as foreign minister for 18 
years from 1974 to 1992， succeeded to Adenauer's legacy of regional 
integration. He often stated that“we Germans must' embed our na-
tional interests in European interests.川叫 Germaninternational trade ?????
事会 Milward， 寸'heMarshall Plan and German Foreign Trade，" 
pp.455-59. 
制 Milward，“TheMarshall Plan and German Foreign Trade，" 
pp.467-74. 
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has been faithful to this policy. ln general， European intra-regional 
trade has been extremely high. lntra-regional trade accounted for 
59 percent of total trade in the EC in 1989， whiIe in East Asia the 
figure was 37 percent， partly due to Asia's high dependence on the 
American market.鍋 WestemEuropean intra-regional trade has 
been remarkably stable since the 1930 s， while the regional share of 
East Asia's trade has decreased constantly.側 Amongthe European 
industrialized countries， Germany has been the most entangled in 
the regional economy. As Table 2 shows， Germany's intra-regional 
exports have been consistent1y high since the 1960 s， accounting for 
more than 60 percent of total German trade. The Netherlands alone 
has been a more important to German trade than alI of Asia com-
bined. During the 1970 s and 1980 s， while French and ltalian ex-
ports to the EC as a percentage of their total exports stagnated or 
felI slightly， inspite of the expansion of EC membership， and Brit-
ain's grew only slightly， German regional exports grew by over 15 
(8~ Cited in Nicholas Colchester and David Buchan， Europower: 
The Essential Guide to Europe's Economic Transformation in 
1992 (New York: Times Books， 1990)， p.209. 
(85) Jeffrey Frankel，“Is a Yen Bloc Forming in Pacific Asia?" The 
Amex Bank Review 18，9 (November 1991)， 2.
附 Long-termregional interdependence is measured here using a 
gravity coefficient that gauges the extent of trade biases to-
ward particular partners relative to the neutral assignment of 
trade across al partners. For more detaiIs and technical discus-
sion on this measurement method， see Peter A. Petri，“The East 
Asian Trading Bloc: An Analytical History，" in Frankel and 
Kahler eds.， Regionalism and Rivalry， pp.23-26. 
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percent. As a result， Germany has had the largest share of the 
Europe market， accounting for more than a quarter since the early 
1980 s， while France's share has been around 15 percent.附Germany's
regional embeddedness has been solidified by lower dependance on 
the Atlantic relation than any other European country. For exam-
ple， Germany's share in foreign direct investment in the Unitecl 
States has never exceeded 10 percent， while Britain's has been 
around 30 percent， and the Netherlands'， 20 percent. The Nether-
lands， Belgium and Luxembourg (the Benelux countries) have a 
larger share of German trade than al North American countries 
combined， including the United States.醐 TheGerman Ambassador 
to the United States encouraged---and discouraged--further deeping 
of Atlantic relations between Germany and the United States by ex司
plaining the internationalization of German trade to a group of 
American businessmen :“The internationalization and even globali. 
zation of our economies is increasing every day. 
Every third mark of our GNP is earned by exports， 60 percent 
of them within Europe. Our economic well-being， indeed our na-
制 AndreiS. Markovits and Simon Reich，“Should Europe Fear 
the Germans?，" in Michael G. Huelshoff， Andrei S. Markovits， 
and Simon Reich， From Bundesrepublic to Deutschland: Ger二
man Politks after Unification (Ann Arbor: The University of 
Michigan Press， 1993)， pp.277-278. 
わゆ James Sperling， “A United Germany， a Single European Eco崎
nomic Space， and the Pτospects for the Atlantic Economy，" in 
Carl F. Lankowski， ed.， Q豆旦担L_<!nd出eEuropean生虫型止
l1j_ty_:__幹回り立_l!(_j盟!!19_!lL担生C回目坦坦目立 (NewYork: St. 
Martin's Press， 1993)， pp.18ト189.
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tional future， istherefore c10sely linked to the development of the 
rest of Europe and especially the European Community.哨 Unlike
]apan， Germany has not spread trade between industrialized and 
developing countries， orsought to balance intra-regional and extra-
regional trade. 
Furthermore， German direct investment abroad has been nei-
出eraggresive nor strategically linked with international trade. The 
prime motive for German industries investing abroad is to take ad-
vantage of market opportunities through local production， ra出er
出anto benefit from the international division of labor. FDI started 
late and developed slowly. It was prohibited by the Allies until 1951， 
and even then German business remained reluctant to rebuild over-
seas investment. Only about DM 400 million was invested up to 
1955， rising to DM 1 billion between 1963 and 65， and DM 2.5 billion 
in 1970. On the other hand， foreign nationals invested over DM 21 
billion in Germany during the 1960 s， which was almost equal to the 
amount of German FDI during the 1950 s and 60 s.側 Inthe 1980 s， 
successful domestic manufacturing industries such as chemical， 
automobile， and electrical engineering invested in both developed 
and developing countries，fl) and the German financial sector in-
creased its FDI in non-European industrial countries， especially the 
United States， but in the 1990 s， the trend has been in favor of re-
gional concentration (see Table 3). 
五
制 Aspeech by Immo Stabreit，“Germany， Europe and Transatlan圃
tic Partnership (Feb.19， 1993)，" in Statements & Speeche:s 14，2 
(n.dよp.2.
。ゆ Hardach，The Political Economy of Germany， p.194. 
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1n sum， institutionalization seems to have succeeded in taming 
German economic power困 While Germany's systemic vulnerability 
in the world economy has been much lower than Japan's， depend-
ence on the regional economy has made Germany vuln.erable to re‘ 
taliation within Europe.(~I! Since the 1980 s， more than 50 percent of 
Germany's economy， whether measured in terms of the national 
economy or industrial output， has depended on trade. Which makes 
Germany twice as vulnerable to systemic collapse in Europe as Ja-
pan， with 25 percent dependence on global trade， isto a failure of 
the world economy.削 Germanpolicy-makers have been fully aware 
of regional vulnerablity and opportunity. The new foreign minister， 




Only if we are firmly anchored in Europe can Germany 
find domestic balance and ful capability to act. This is 
an impressive lesson to be derived from our past as 
well as from our knowledge of economic power factors 
in comparison with Japan and the United States of 
America.糊
Jorn Keck and Henry Kragenau， Japansche und Deutsche Di-
rektinvestitionen im Ausland: Bestandsaufnahme und Ver-
足也Q，Mit臼ilungendes 1nstitut fur Asienkunde Hamburg， 
Nummer 71 (Hamburg: 1nstitut fur Asienkunde Hamburg， 
1975); Jamuna P. Agarwal， Anclrea Gubitz， and Peter Nun-
nenkamp， Foreign Direct Investment iri Developing Countries: 
The Case of Germany， Kieler Studen 238 (Tubingen: J.C.B. 
Mohr，1991) 
For tracle structure in Western Europe， see Friman，自主也or主
丘旦区山国型1pp. 142-146. 
Komiya， Japanese Economy， p.77. 
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4. Conclusion 
This analysis has stressed the differing degree of systemic vul-
nerability that the ]apanese and German states have encountered in 
the process of changing international structure. ]apan's liberaliza-
tion of development cooperation policy since the mid-1970 s can be 
attributed to the transformation of the international economic 
structure.倒 Whenwe bring Germany in， we have to ask how struc-
tural change in the international system can have led these two 
functionally delimited jun ior partners of the United States to adopt 
such very different paths in their foreign economic policies toward 
developing countries. Regional embeddedness， 1 argued， provide us 
with an answer to the puzzle derived from international structural 
explanations. ]apan's policy objective since the mid-1970 s， when 
the policy change took place， has been to share the cost of interna-
tional public goods commensurate with its economic power. In 
sharing the international burden， special emphasis was put on stable 
development of North-South relations. Germany， instriking con-
trast， has been situated within a region of Europe whose stable in-
stitutions have insulated the state from international economic dis-
turbances. Vast amounts of intra -industry trade and inv田tment
(94) A speech by Kinkel，“Responsibility， Realism: Providing for 
the Future German Foreign Policy in a W orld Undergoing a 
Process of Restructuring (March 19， 1993)，" in Statements & 
包竺生堅， 14，5 (n.d.)， p.3. 
(9~ David A. Lake， Power， Protectiol1， and Free Trade: Interna-
tional Sources of U.S. Commercial Strategy， 1887-1939 (Ithaca: 
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within the region have created a zone of stability and growth un1ike 
anything ]apan can hope for. Instead of calibrating its DC policy to 
maintain the existing international economic order， the German 
state took advantage of development cooperation in realizing the 
national economic interests. This paper implies that the post-Cold 
War international order has been more afected by vulnerability that 
derives from interdependence process rather than by power that is 
structurally determined. 
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